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BOOK REVIEWS
Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, by William J. Abraham. William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006. xiv + 198 pp. $20.00 (paper).
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University and University of Virginia
My good friend “Billy” Abraham introduces this recent book of his by 
observing that most of those who have written about the epistemology 
of religious belief in recent years have had some sort of generic theism in 
mind, and were inquiring into the epistemic status of commitment to such 
theism. (He acknowledges that Alvin Plantinga’s discussion in Warranted 
Christian Belief is an exception to this generalization.) His own project is 
instead to inquire into the epistemic status of commitment to what he calls 
“canonical theism.” By this he means “that rich vision of God, creation, 
and redemption developed over time in the scriptures, articulated in the 
Nicene Creed, celebrated in the liturgy of the church, enacted in the lives 
of the saints, handed over and received in the sacraments, depicted in ico-
nography, articulated by canonical teachers, mulled over in the Fathers, 
and treasured, preserved, and guarded by the episcopate” (p. 43). To this 
he adds the explanatory qualification that it is “the theism officially devel-
oped in the church prior to the great schism” (p. 14; italics mine).
Abraham observes that the “standard procedure” for developing an 
account of the epistemic status of commitment to generic theism has been 
first to work out a general account of rationality, justification, knowl-
edge, warrant, or whatever, and then to apply this general account to the 
specific case of commitment to generic theism (p. 8). In this procedure, 
most of the work goes into developing the general account; the applica-
tion to generic theism passes by swiftly. Abraham proposes reversing 
the order. Start with a person’s commitment to canonical theism, and 
then articulate an epistemology for such commitment that satisfies the 
“principle of appropriate epistemic fit” (p. 11). Abraham’s central claim, 
the claim around which the entire book is organized, is that when we fol-
low this procedure, we will find that we must give central place to divine 
revelation. “An appeal to divine revelation [is] central to the warrants for 
canonical theism” (p. 79); “divine revelation is a critical component of 
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any adequate epistemology relevant to the truth or falsehood of canoni-
cal theism” (p. 43).
Abraham is aware of the fact that there is a long tradition of giving 
central position to divine revelation in the epistemology of Christian be-
lief (p. 5). In that respect, he sees himself as engaged in a retrieval project; 
Plantinga is typical of recent writers in that revelation plays no structural 
role in his epistemology of religious belief (p. 97). As we shall see, how-
ever, Abraham strongly disagrees with the tradition on just how the idea 
of divine revelation is to be employed.
In the course of his discussion, Abraham has fine things to say on a 
number of particular topics; his discussion of conversion, for example, is 
superb. But I find his overall argument baffling. Let me explain why.
One understanding of divine revelation in the Christian tradition is 
that revelation occurs when a person comes to believe something by a 
special act of God rather than by the employment of his or her innate 
faculties; this is how such different thinkers as Thomas Aquinas and John 
Locke understood revelation. On this understanding, the traditional dis-
tinction between general and special revelation makes no sense; all revela-
tion is special. Anybody who employs that distinction, as does Abraham, 
is working with a different concept.
Revelation, for Abraham, is manifesting what was previously hidden, 
disclosing it (p. 84). Divine revelation “can be general, that is, in creation 
and conscience; it can be special, that is, in the history of Israel; and it can 
be extraspecial, that is, in Jesus Christ.” The content of divine revelation 
can be “the hidden depths of the human condition,” or it can be “the na-
ture and purposes of God” (p. 84). Abraham focuses entirely on the latter. 
The idea is not that, in addition to God’s other actions, God also performs 
the action of revealing himself. Rather, in and through God’s other actions, 
God reveals himself. It is in and through the actions of salvation, healing, 
and restoration “that God is truly revealed and made known. To develop a 
vision of revelation independently of them is profoundly misleading and 
distorting” (p. 65). Not all of God’s acts are equally revelatory, however. 
God’s acts of speaking are especially revelatory (p. 60).
Let it be noted that this idea of divine revelation plays an altogether 
minor role in canonical theism. Abraham appears to regard the Nicene 
Creed as stating the heart of canonical theism. The Creed says nothing 
about revelation. In canonical theism, says Abraham, “God is primarily 
identified as the creator and redeemer of the world” (p. 79). Exactly so; 
God is identified as creator and redeemer, not as one who reveals things 
about himself. In Christian scripture we do, now and then, find the idea of 
God making known something about himself that was previously hidden; 
but the idea, though present, is far from dominant.
The Creed does say that the Holy Spirit “spake by the prophets”; and 
some will take this to be a passing reference to revelation. Perhaps Abra-
ham takes it that way; it’s not clear to me whether he does or doesn’t. In 
my Divine Discourse I argued that speaking is neither to be identified with 
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revealing nor understood as a special case of revealing. I don’t know what 
Abraham thinks of my argument; he nowhere mentions Divine Discourse. 
He says that “claims to divine revelation . . . show up informally in the 
canonical heritage of the church” (p. 77) and that “the canonical heritage 
informally claims that God has revealed himself uniquely in Christ” (p. 
63). I take the word “informally” to be an indication of the fact that Abra-
ham recognizes that the doctrine of divine revelation is, at most, a minor 
part of canonical theism.
Abraham’s claim, then, is not that the doctrine of divine revelation has 
a significant place in the content of canonical theism; his claim is rather 
that this doctrine is indispensable for articulating the epistemic status of 
commitment to canonical theism. He calls revelation an “epistemological 
concept” (p. 85). And he says that “at the core of the faith, as seen from an 
epistemic point of view, there is a special divine revelation that comes to 
us from without and brings the truth about God and ourselves to a burn-
ing focus” (p. 56). So let us now turn to Abraham’s epistemology.
Abraham prepares for his account of the epistemic status of commit-
ment to canonical theism by positing a sizeable number of what he calls 
“epistemic platitudes,” eleven, to be exact. So as to give the reader a sense 
of what these come to, let me quote two of them. “We can and should ac-
cept the general reliability of our senses, together with the belief-forming 
mechanisms and practices that accompany them” (p. 36). And “we can 
and should accept testimony. We rightly accept what others tell us with-
out having first established that they are worthy of trust” (p. 37). Abra-
ham’s strategy is to “move from the epistemic platitudes to theism” (p. 
39); he will appeal to these platitudes in articulating the epistemic status 
of commitment to canonical theism.
About this introduction to the topic, let me say just two things. Though 
I myself accept all of the so-called platitudes, these eleven theses by no 
means function as platitudes in the field of epistemology. On the contrary, 
they are highly controversial epistemological positions. And the fact that 
Abraham will help himself to these general epistemological theses in the 
course of articulating an epistemology that fits canonical theism makes his 
procedure suspiciously like the standard procedure that he criticized.
For the purpose of developing his epistemology, Abraham invites us 
to think of canonical theism as having two levels. The first, or lower, level 
consists of claims concerning God’s actions of creation and redemption, 
and claims as to what God reveals about himself by so acting. No doubt 
acceptance of claims concerning God’s creative activity gets formed in 
different people in different ways. The mode of formation that Abraham 
highlights is clear from the following:
We simply find ourselves aware of the reality of God in our inner experience 
and in our encountering the world. Thus we are aware of God in creation 
and in his speaking to us in our conscience. We experience God, as it were, 
straight off, as we perceive the world around us. We have a sense, however 
vague, of God and his presence in the world and in our lives. We have, in 
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the language of Hugh of St. Victor, an oculus contemplationis, a contemplative 
or spiritually discerning eye. In this case our ability to perceive God’s active 
presence in creation is basic and bedrock. (p. 67)
“We come equipped with an original, native capacity to perceive God’s 
general and special revelation in the world” (p. 80).
This is purely descriptive. As to the epistemic appraisal of such beliefs 
so formed, Abraham says that the Reformed epistemologists are right to 
insist that “we are entitled to believe in the general revelation of God in 
creation without first having to hand good arguments for the reality of 
God. . . . We do not need first to establish that we have spiritual senses, 
check out how reliable they are, and then decide to trust them. As with our 
other senses, we work from an initial position of trust” (p. 67).
Abraham’s description of the formation of beliefs about God’s redemp-
tive activity goes along the same lines.
In perceiving this or that prophet as a bearer of a message from God, the 
believer is not forming and testing a religious hypothesis. In seeing, say, 
Jeremiah or Paul as a recipient of divine revelation, the believer finds herself 
drawn to believe that God has called and commissioned Jeremiah and Paul 
to be bearers of special revelation. In seeing in Jesus Christ the incarnation of 
God, the believer in listening to the gospel about Jesus finds herself drawn to 
believe that he is the Son of God. In these instances of special and extraspe-
cial revelation, the believer sees God speaking and acting in very particular 
ways. To deploy once more the language of the senses, one senses that God 
is here, in Jeremiah or in Jesus, speaking and revealing himself in the world. 
(p. 72)
As one would expect, Abraham’s epistemic appraisal of such beliefs 
so formed is the same as for beliefs about God’s creative activity: one is 
entitled to such beliefs.
As a Reformed epistemologist I am, of course, sympathetic to what 
Abraham says here. I think that entitlement to hold the beliefs in ques-
tion is rather more complicated than Abraham indicates in these passages. 
But these complications are epicycles on the basic picture that Abraham 
draws here; and in other passages, he indicates that he also thinks the full 
picture is more complicated. (In my Belief Practices: Essays in Epistemology 
[Cambridge, 2010] I develop a general theory of entitlement.)
What I want to call attention to, however, is the fact that the idea of 
divine revelation plays no role whatsoever in Abraham’s epistemology of 
a person’s commitment to the lower level of canonical theism. The episte-
mology is entirely about being entitled to accept the deliverances of one’s 
innate faculty for the formation of immediate beliefs about God’s activity. 
Abraham uses the distinction between general and special revelation to 
identify two types of divine action; but one can use other concepts than 
those to identify those same two types, as I did. And he uses the concept 
of revelation to say that Jeremiah and Paul were recipients of divine rev-
elation; but that is, of course, a different matter from whether you and I 
are entitled to believe that they were recipients of divine revelation. In 
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Abraham’s account of such entitlement, the idea of divine revelation plays 
no role.
But is it not perhaps an accident of the examples Abraham offers that 
divine revelation plays no role in his epistemology here? St. Paul speaks 
in Romans 1 about the eternal power and divine nature of God being seen 
through the things God has made. This is an example of God revealing 
something of himself in his actions. So might Abraham not have offered, 
as one of his examples, a person’s coming to believe that the cosmos is a 
manifestation of God’s eternal power and divine nature?
He might indeed. But the concept of revelation would in that case have 
entered into the content of the belief; and that, once again, is different from 
playing a role in determining or assessing the epistemic status of the belief.
May it be that it is when we get to the epistemic status of a person’s ac-
ceptance of the second level of canonical theism that we need to employ 
the idea of divine revelation? The second level of canonical theism consists 
of claims about God that are neither claims about God’s creative and re-
demptive actions nor claims that can plausibly be viewed as claims about 
what God reveals of himself in those actions. The full-blown doctrines 
of the Trinity and the Incarnation are Abraham’s examples. He observes 
that there is a strand within Protestantism that is extremely reluctant to 
concede that these doctrines cannot be arrived at by interpretation of what 
Scripture teaches; I agree with Abraham that they were not so arrived at 
and cannot be so arrived at. (I should speak up in defense of my own 
tradition at this point. Abraham describes the Scots Confession of 1560 as 
declaring that all doctrine is to be grounded in scripture; what the Confes-
sion in fact says is that no doctrine may be “contrary” to scripture.)
How then did the church arrive at the doctrines of Trinity and Incar-
nation?
If we must work with convenient slogans and summary statements, we 
might say that the doctrine of the Trinity arose over time out of the deep in-
teraction of the special revelation of God in Israel, the extraspecial revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ, experience of God in the Holy Spirit, and sanctified 
creative imagination and reason. It is radically incomplete and inadequate 
to trace the kind of revolutionary change in the doctrine of God represented 
by the Nicene Creed merely to the divine revelation enshrined in scripture. 
We must also take into account the place of religious experience, imagina-
tion, and reason. We must also provide ample space for the guidance of the 
Holy Spirit in leading the church into the truth about God. . . . We might 
capture this move in terms of a vision of divine inspiration working in, with, 
and through the life of the church as a whole. (pp. 106–107)
This is a description of the emergence of the doctrines; what is Abra-
ham’s assessment of the epistemic status of accepting them? I find him 
less than fully lucid on this point. But I think his thought runs along the 
following lines. One of the first-level beliefs that we hold is that “there 
really was a unique and special revelation given to the world through 
Israel in Jesus of Nazareth.” We then reason that since “the understand-
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ing of this divine revelation is not immediately apparent, . . . it would be 
extremely odd for God to go to these lengths to make known his name and 
not provide critical assistance to the church as a whole in unpacking what 
this means” (p. 106). Having reasoned along those lines, we find ourselves 
trusting that the Spirit has inspired the church in arriving at these doc-
trines. If we wish, we can support that trust by rehearsing what it was that 
led the church to arrive at these doctrines in the first place.
Much could be said about all this. But on this occasion, the point I want 
to make is that, also at this second level, the idea of divine revelation plays 
no role in Abraham’s epistemic assessment of a person’s commitment to 
canonical theism. The epistemology is entirely about being entitled to 
trust, on the basis of an inference from certain immediate beliefs about 
God’s activity that one is entitled to hold, that the Spirit led the church to 
arrive at the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation.
Let me add that not only does the idea of divine revelation not play 
a role in Abraham’s epistemology at this point; to one’s surprise it does 
not even play a role in his description of how the doctrines of Trinity and 
Incarnation emerged. If the Spirit inspired the church to formulate and 
adopt these doctrines, is that inspiration not a revelatory activity of God? 
And if it is, then presumably the epistemology that Abraham employed 
for the first level is applicable for this level as well.
Abraham rejects the hyper-Protestant practice of identifying divine 
revelation with scripture and of holding that a doctrine is acceptable only 
if it can be arrived at by biblical interpretation. He proposes that instead 
of thinking of revelation as having this grounding function for doctrine 
we think of the acceptance of revelation as “perspective constituting” (p. 
114) or “world-constituting” (p. 143). What he means is that, once one 
comes to believe that God has acted creatively and redemptively, then lots 
of things look different, including one’s epistemological situation; for ex-
ample, accepting the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation no longer looks 
like a bizarre sacrificium intellectus. Accepting divine revelation, he says, is 
like crossing a threshold. And surely he is right about that. But what leads 
to the reorientation is not just beliefs about what God reveals of himself in 
his actions; what leads to the reorientation is beliefs about God’s actions 
in general—not just the belief that God’s eternal power and divine nature 
are manifested in creation, but the belief that the cosmos as a whole, and 
human beings within it, have been created by God.
The source of my bafflement will now be clear. Abraham says that what 
he has done is “drop the idea of divine revelation into the debate.” He 
has indeed done this. But I fail to see that the idea does any epistemologi-
cal work for him. Worse, it sometimes leads him into distorting canonical 
theism—as it has led many of his and my predecessors into distortion.
In canonical theism, and in the scriptures out of which canonical theism 
emerged, there is a delicate balance of focus between, on the one hand, 
God’s actions of creation, providence, redemption, and consummation, 
and, on the other hand, what these actions reveal about God. In those who 
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give a dominant role to the doctrine of divine revelation, there is a discern-
ible tendency for this balanced focus to be upset. The theologian’s focus is 
displaced, for example, from the fact that God was in Christ reconciling the 
world to himself, to what this action reveals about God. Abraham speaks of 
“the gracious unveiling of God in the covenant acts and deliverance of Is-
rael from Egypt” (p. 96). To the best of my knowledge, no biblical writer lo-
cates God’s grace in the unveiling that occurs in God’s deliverance of Israel 
from Egypt; they all locate it in God’s deliverance of Israel from Egypt.
In our relationship to our fellow human beings, such displacement of 
focus would often be insulting. I insult you if, instead of responding to 
your request for aid, I focus my attention on what your making of this 
request reveals about you. Are things different in our relationship to God?
The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, by Lynne 
Rudder Baker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xv + 253 pp.
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College
Practical realism, the name given to her position by Lynne Rudder Baker, 
is analytic metaphysics with a difference. The difference is stated emphati-
cally by Baker in her concluding summary:
It is time to get on the table an alternative to the dominant metaphysical 
theories that accord no ontological significance to things that everyone cares 
about—not only concrete objects like one’s car keys, or the Mona Lisa, but 
also commonplace states of affairs like being employed next year, or having 
enough money for retirement. I believe that such ordinary phenomena are 
the stuff of reality, and I have tried to offer a metaphysics that has room in its 
ontology for the ordinary things that people value. (p. 240)
Baker’s first chapter is entitled “Beginning in the middle,” a phrase 
which carries three distinct though related meanings. We begin with our 
actual language, with its embedded picture of the world. We also begin 
in the middle epistemologically, aware of our presuppositions but not at-
tempting to eliminate them as Descartes did. And we begin with the medi-
um-sized objects—people, nonhuman organisms, natural objects, artifacts, 
and artworks—that are of primary concern to us in our lives. Of particular 
importance are “ID phenomena”—objects, properties, and events that are 
“intention-dependent,” in that their existence depends on the existence of 
persons with propositional attitudes. Unlike a number of other metaphys-
ical views, Baker’s approach takes ID phenomena with utmost seriousness 
and refuses to relegate them to second-class ontological status.
The agenda thus established is pursued in part I, “Everyday Things.” 
Chapter 2 argues for the reality and non-reducibility of ordinary things, 
a theme which continues in chapter 3 on artifacts, to which Baker (unlike 
many others from Aristotle on down) accords full ontological status. Any 
